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Abstract 
In this article we investigate whether there is persistency in analysts forecasting ability 
and if it exists, whether the market has the ability to identify these differences in abilities. Our 
results reveal that the forecasting ability of analysts is persistent. We then investigate whether 
investors identify superior analysts’ ability by analyzing market reaction to their 
recommendations compared to the reaction to other analysts. Our findings suggest that the two-
day returns after the analysts’ reports’ are strongly positively correlated with analysts’ 
recommendations and there is a significant difference in reaction between high and low quality 
analysts. We conclude that the market is smart enough to identify different types of analysts and 
follow their recommendations respectively.  
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1: Introduction 
In Merton’s theory [J. Finance 42 (1987) 483.] on market information segmentation, 
investors only invest in securities known to them. Therefore, stock analysts play an important role 
in minimizing information asymmetry in the market. Although some intraday returns evidence 
shows that announcements of analysts’ forecast revisions release little new information 
(Altınkılıç, Balashov and Hansen 2013), it is widely agreed that analysts’ reports provide 
beneficial information, such as three key summary measures: an earning forecast, a stock 
recommendation and a price target (Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2005). To outperform other 
investors, both institutional players and individual players in the market are interested in the 
accuracy of the analysts’ reports. If an analyst can prove his/her superiority, such as providing 
highly accurate earnings estimations, investors in the market should follow his/her 
recommendation closely. The aforementioned situation exists when, first, superior analysts exist 
and significantly outperform their peers and, second, other market participants are able to 
recognize and follow superior analysts’ recommendations and profit from them. 
In a perfectly efficient market, as assumed in the efficient-market hypothesis, analysts’ 
reports are not valuable to investors because all the available information has been reflected in the 
stock prices. However, many studies have shown that by collecting and analyzing related 
information, analysts are able to add significant value to the portfolios (e.g. Fang and Yasuda 
2013). Among all the analysts, the differences in the forecasting ability of financial analysts do 
exist (e.g. Stickel 1992; Sinha, Brown, Das 1997; Leone and Wu 2007). To further examine why 
the differences exist, researchers examined the determinants of forecast accuracy, such as 
experience (Clement 1999), employer (Kerl and Ohlert 2015) and designation (Franco and Zhou 
2009). With respect to the market reaction, scholars have examined North America (Chung and 
Kryzanowski 2001) and Asia (Ding, Chen and Wu 2014; Chen and Hong 2006). Analysts’ 
persistent performance is also studied by other scholars. Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) find 
that analysts whose recommendation revisions earned the most (least) excess returns in the past 
continue to outperform (underperform) in the future. Li (2005) also finds that analysts with 
above-median risk-adjusted performance in the estimation period persistently outperform those 
with below-median performance in the subsequent holdout period. 
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Previous studies also investigated the degree to which the market reacts to the 
recommendations. Hilary and Hsu (2013) find that on average, analysts with a lower standard 
deviation of forecast errors have a better ability to move prices. This shows that investors are 
willing to listen to analysts who demonstrate persistent forecast ability. Some claims of under-
weighting of forecasts (Elgers et al.’s 2001) while some evidence of over-weighting of such 
forecasts (Dechow et al. 1999; and Frankel and Lee 1998).  
This article contributes to the literature by combining the investigation in forecasting 
ability and the market’s ability to identify the different forecasting ability. First, we analyze 
whether analysts differ in the earnings forecast ability. Second, we analyze whether the market 
recognizes the persistent ability, and reacts to analysts’ recommendations.  
Like some previous studies (such as Hall and Tacon 2010), we also hypothesize that the 
estimation accuracy for earnings is the indicator of analysts’ forecasting ability. Following the 
line of argumentation by Sinha, Brown and Das (1997), we categorized analysts into two groups, 
superior and inferior. The first half of the analysts (at a given firm-year) are considered superior 
analysts while the others are considered inferior analysts. We utilize that IBES and CRSP 
databases and examine approximately 2,514,938 analysts’ reports written by approximately 
61,398 analysts between October 1993 and June 2016 that contain forecasts and 
recommendations for the capital market. 
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2: Data Sample 
2.1 Data Source 
Our sample contains a panel of analyst reports from October 1993 to June 2016 obtained 
from IBES. The data contains these following: the analyst code, the firm that an analyst is trying 
to estimate, the date that estimation is made, the estimated EPS value and the actual EPS value 
and the date that the real EPS was released, that is to say, the actual announcement date. For the 
EPS value, we use the annual data and the estimation EPS is to estimate this annual EPS. 
The sample includes analyst reports covering 22,826 US based companies. For every report, 
we require the analysts’ estimations for stock recommendation and forecast for earnings per share. 
Overall, our sample of 2,514,938 reports is based on 23,101 individual analysts issuing 21,362 
EPS estimations covering 22,826 stocks. In the analysis for market reaction, we obtain data from 
IBES for 2,514,938 reports issued by 61,398 analysts. We obtained market data from CRSP with 
approximately 121,000,000 daily holding period returns and daily value weighted returns. 
In order to clean the data, we implement a screening process on the raw data. First, to 
ensure that the market is reacting to the recommendation rather than companies’ earnings 
announcements, we only include analyst reports published at least two days after the quarterly 
earnings announcements. For example, a company publishes its quarterly earnings per share on 
July 7th and one analyst publishes his/her report on July 7th or 8th. At the same time, we find that 
the abnormal return of that company fluctuates largely on July 7th, 8th or 9th. This kind of 
observation could result from the company’s earnings announcement but not from the analyst 
report. Therefore, we set a two-day period before taking an analyst forecast into consideration. 
The assumption is that after two days, the impact of the company’s announcement is no longer 
affecting prices and is fully absorbed by the market. 
Furthermore, we try to avoid the small sample bias effect by excluding companies that 
have less than four analyst reports in the past 25 years. That is to say, any company that has less 
than 4 analysts providing forecast is discarded.  In a small sample, the ranking could be the result 
of random events or luck. For example, if there are only two analysts forecasting the earnings per 
share of a company, even a small difference will result in two completely different categories, a 
superior analyst and an inferior analyst. When in fact, their forecasting abilities are at the same 
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level. If a company has an only one-year observation or there is only one year that has more than 
4 analysts followed, then this should be eliminated since we are not just ranking them but want to 
see if there is persistency among years. If we cannot find at least two consecutive years, then we 
don’t use this firm in the analysis. 
Moreover, among several forecasts during one year, we only include the most recent 
forecast of the analyst prior to the actual earnings announcement. For example, it is very common 
for an analyst to estimate one company’s earnings per share several times before the company’s 
announcement. As the company announcement date approaches, the analyst will have more 
information and more recent data about the company. Therefore, we assume the last forecast 
before the earnings announcement is the best indicator of the analyst’s forecasting ability because, 
at that time, the analyst is closest to the earnings announcement. In a sense, it also levels the 
playing field between analysts because one would think that all analysts try to be accurate just 
before the earnings announcement is made. Even if not all analysts provide a forecast close to the 
earnings announcement, one would think that the hard-working “superior” analyst would do all 
they can in order to be accurate so they provide a relatively adequate forecast just before the 
earnings news. That is to say, those analysts that are willing to spend more time and energy 
deserve a better rank and we want to use their last estimation to see how good they are. 
To analyze the persistency of analysts’ forecasting ability, our data will be sorted in groups 
that follow: for a given fiscal year, an analyst would have only one recommendation left for a 
given firm (the one that is closest to the next EPS announcement). 
From IBES Database, we are also able to get all recommendations given by these analysts. 
However, not all the recommendations are good to use. If a recommendation is made to a non-US 
based firm, it is eliminated as the estimation ability is only tested according to how good an 
analyst is to estimate the EPS of a US-firm. 
Furthermore, we analyze market reaction to recommendations in the year following the 
rating of analysts’ accuracy. Therefore, if the stock is not traded in the following year or the 
analysts have stopped following the firm in the following year, the analyst is essentially excluded 
from the analysis.  
Additionally, due to data availability constrain in CRSP, we only have real earnings per 
share untill the end of 2015. So we drop estimate earnings per share data in 2016. Any other 
missing values in core variables are also not acceptable. 
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2.2 Data Measures 
To measure each analyst’s forecast accuracy of earnings per share for each company in 
every year, we use the actual earnings per share after the analyst’s earnings forecast for 
comparison with the initial forecast. A lower value corresponds to a more accurate forecast. The 
analyst’s forecast accuracy, ABS_DIFF, is the absolute forecast accuracy of the difference 
between actual earnings per share and the estimated earnings per share of the analyst.  
To measure the market reaction to the recommendations, we use the recommendations that 
are rated by Thomson Reuters in five levels. For each recommendation, important information to 
use in this task is firm code, analyst code, recommendation date and the recommendation level 
(from 1 strong buy to 5 sell). 
2.3 Superior-analysts Classification 
Based on the group generated in the data section, we can rank these estimations according 
to the absolute difference of estimation and actual value. The definition of absolute difference is ABS$%&& = EPS*+,-..+/012%-/ − EPS4,2516	 .  The smaller this number, the more accurate the 
recommendation is. Given a certain time, for a fixed firm, this number is comparable between 
analysts. The superior analysts are identified by the ranking percentage of the forecast accuracy. 
After we have the absolute difference between estimated earnings per share and the actual 
earnings per share, we find out the percentile of each forecast at a firm-year level. The top 50% of 
the firm’s forecasts are considered to be forecasts from superior analysts. The other 50% analysts 
are inferior analysts of that company in that year. In the persistency analysis, we further 
investigate if the classification changes in different years.  
In the market reaction analysis, we have two ways to classify superior analysts. The easier 
method is that based on the result from persistency analysis, we assume two static groups of 
analysts in each year, the superior analysts and inferior analysts. We use the average percentage 
ranking of analysts to define if an analyst is a superior analyst or inferior analyst. After this 
classification, we investigate how abnormal returns relate to the two static groups every year. The 
more accurate way to classify superior analysts is to keep all the evaluation results in all years. 
Therefore, we have more data and two dynamic groups of analysts in each year. For example, for 
analyst A, he may be a superior analyst analyzing Apple in 2001 but may be an inferior analyst 
analyzing Apple in 2002. Then we investigate how year N+1’s abnormal returns relate to the year 
N’s two dynamic groups of analysts. 
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3: Forecast Accuracy and Persistency Analysis 
In this part, we want to discuss whether the quality of an analyst is better measured at the 
firm-year level or at the year-level. Nowadays, people have witnessed more and more “star 
analysts”, among these analysts, these analysts are not only with financial backgrounds but also 
have PhD with math or physics background, some even have a biology degree that focuses on the 
medicine industry. It is easy to tell that a single person would have limited knowledge, no one is 
good at everything. Therefore, it is reasonable that an analyst might not have a very good ability 
to estimate all companies. But rather analyst ability may be firm specific. That is to say, if an 
analyst is good at estimating Apple’s EPS in year 2011 for example, he/she may not be good in 
estimating other companies, such as Walmart or AT&T. An alternative view is that most of the 
estimating knowledge is economy-wide so if you are good in estimating Apple, you are also good 
in estimating other companies. Hence, the question to ask is whether analyst accuracy ability 
firm-specific or economy-wide? 
For each group (on a firm-year level), we can have the ranking of forecasting ability of 
analysts. This rank is in percentage, it means for a given year, a given firm, the percentage 
position an analyst is. For instance, if this number is 100% for an analyst estimating Firm A in 
1995, then this analyst has the worst estimation of Firm A in Year 1995. To test if the rank 
percentage and the classification change in different years, we simplify two classes into 0 and 1, 
where 1 stands for superior analysts and 0 stands for inferior analysts. We try to find out the 
relationship between the year and the year after.  
If there is persistency, then the data will show a significant evidence that if an analyst is 
“superior” in year N, then this analyst should have a higher probability than 50% to stay in 
“superior” group in year N+1. This test can be also done in year N+2 to have a further 
confirmation. A simple t-test will clearly show if superiority is persistent and significance. We do 
a stricter t-test. If the analyst quality is in superior in the former year, would this analyst be 
expected to do better than another analyst that is in the inferior group? A t-test can show this 
difference. If these two groups have significantly difference average in the coming year and the 
superior group is higher than the inferior group, then we can say there is indeed a persistency in 
the analyst quality. 
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From Table 1 Panel 1, we can see that “inferior” group in the former year tends to show 
more persistency in the following year, and the difference in the next year given the same analyst 
in two groups in the former year is significant. That is to say, in year N, we have two groups of 
analysts, half of them are marked as “superior” while the others are marked as “inferior”. In year 
N+1, those analysts from “superior” groups have a higher probability to stay in “superior” groups. 
Those from “inferior” groups have a higher chance to stay in “inferior” groups. What’s more, the 
persistency in “inferior” group is more significant. Our results show that it is difficult for analysts 
to change their classifications, which means that in most cases, superior analysts will stay in 
superior class and inferior analysts will stay in inferior class. Furthermore, comparing between 
superior analysts and inferior analysts, it is more likely for the superior analysts to drop into the 
inferior class in the following years. 
There are two possible reasons for this result. First, the market is not easy to follow and it 
is indeed hard to be always correct. To keep in the superior group is definitely harder than to keep 
in the inferior group (e.g. if you always make bad estimations, you will be always in the bad 
group for sure but this will not hold even if you are a very good analyst.). This is the most 
important reason that the good group does not have the same extent of significance as the bad 
group. Secondly, if we test the persistency with a 2-year lag in Table 1 Panel B there is a better 
significance in “superior” groups. This test is to test this change: an analyst might move to 
another group in the following year, but if he/she is really a good analyst, the next year he/she 
should get back to the “superior” group. Our t-test with the 2-year lag proves that superior 
analysts are likely to improve in the following years even if some fail in the first year. 
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4: Market Reactions to Superior-Analysts’ Recommendations 
In order to test if the market reacts to the recommendation given by the analyst, first, we 
need to find out the relationship between abnormal return, which is defined as holding period 
return minus value-weighted return. If there is more positive information outside the market, this 
abnormal return will be higher, and vice versa. We assume the market will need two days to fully 
absorb the effect of this recommendation, so this abnormal return should be calculated over a 2-
day period after the recommendation is made.  
Based on this abnormal return, we want to see if the superior analysts and the inferior 
analysts have different extent of influence. In order to check this conclusion, we need to find a 
way to test what kind of analyst can be named as “superior analyst”. Based on what we discussed 
in persistency part, there is a persistency in the forecasting ability of analyst in different years. So 
we use the average percentage rank of an analyst to define if he is good or not. All analysts are 
divided into two groups for each firm, superior or inferior. For example, from 1993-2016, if 
analyst A’s absolute difference of EPS estimation of firm F has an average percentage rank less 
than 50%, that means on average, this analyst is in the first half, then we will name A as “A is 
good for F”, if analyst B has a percentage rank of more than 50%, that means on average, analyst 
B is in the bottom half, we will name B as “B is bad for F”. 
Having all the recommendations that are good to use, we can then check whether an 
analyst is “superior” or “inferior” given the firm he/she is making this recommendation. Finally, 
the recommendation data will contain 6 main variables: firm code (cusip), analyst code, 
recommendation date, abnormal return, recommendation level and a dummy variable – 1 for 
good and 0 for bad. Of which, the most important one is abnormal return, we are trying to find 
out whether the recommendation has an impact on this abnormal return and whether the ability of 
analyst contributes to this effect.  
We first run a regression using year-level recommendations. The result shows that only 5 
years out of the 21-years have significant coefficients, which means that only using year-level 
regression cannot provide meaningful conclusions. However, the significant negative coefficient 
of Change in recommendation shows that market will react when it is regressed on a firm-year 
level. Therefore, in the next two regressions, we focus our investigation on the firm-year level. 
  9 
Then we do the firm-year level regression. The regression is done using only abnormal 
return, and the recommendation based on the firm level. If the market reacts to the 
recommendation, then the with the number going up in recommendation level, which means a 
downgrade of a firm, will have a decreasing abnormal return and this effect should be significant 
and an upgrade of a firm would see an increasing in abnormal return. 
From Table 2 Panel A (1), we can see that the coefficient of change in recommendation 
given a firm (drecom) is very significant and is negative which matches our guess. The market 
does react to the recommendations made by analysts. Note here we should use cluster(cusip) 
since the error between various firm might be different. If we don’t use cluster analysis, the basic 
assumption of linear regression – homoscedasticity will be violated. 
Next, we are interested in whether the market can distinguish recommendation from 
superior or inferior analysts. That is to say, we want to find out whether the recommendation 
from a superior analyst will have a different impact from that of an inferior analyst. In order to do 
this, we need to add some more variables in the regression. One variable to add in is the quality of 
analyst (dummy variable, good or bad). But simply add this variable doesn’t mean anything. It’s 
not difficult to tell that simply this variable would be insignificant because the abnormal returns 
should not be affected by the quality of an analyst, the recommendation, of course, is what really 
matters. Thus, the interaction term of quality and recommendation is what we are interested in. If 
this interaction term is significant, then that means the market reacts differently regarding the 
quality of analyst. The sign of this interaction term should be the same as that of the 
recommendation. If this holds, then it means the superior analysts have more influence over the 
market abnormal return compared to the inferior analysts. If this interaction term is significant but 
has a different sign from the recommendation, then it suggests the inferior analysts have more 
influence in the abnormal return, the market is following the inferior analysts rather than the 
superior ones. If this interaction term is not significant then it indicates the market might not be 
able to tell the difference between superior and inferior analysts as its abnormal return is affected 
regardless the quality of analyst. 
From Table 2 Panel A (2), it seems that the superior and inferior analysts seem to have 
quite a similar impact to the market. That is to say, we do not have clear evidence to show that the 
market is smart enough to distinguish the recommendation of a superior analyst from a bad ones. 
To test the market in a more dynamic way, we use the dynamic classification of superior 
analysts and inferior analysts in the following regression in Table 2 Panel B. As described in the 
Data Sample section, we do not use the average performance of the analysts to classify the 
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superior analyst group and the inferior analyst group. Instead, we keep all the performances of 
each analyst on each company in each year. Therefore, we are able to investigate whether an 
analyst who is classified to be superior in year N will trigger a reaction in the market’s abnormal 
return in year N+1 based on his/her recommendation in year N+1. 
From Table 2 Panel B (1), we can first prove that the market still reacts to the analysts’ 
recommendation as a whole. In Table 2 Panel B (2), the result shows that after being recognized 
as a superior analyst, the analyst’s recommendation in the next year will trigger an abnormal 
return in the market. Thus, we can confidently conclude that the market is smart enough to 
distinguish the recommendation of a superior analyst from an inferior ones.  
The reason why the regression in Table 2 Panel A (2) does not show significant may be 
that the static way of classification ignores the fact that an analyst’s performance in later years is 
not able to affect the market in the previous years. For example, in a 15-years period, an analyst is 
an inferior analyst in the ten years and superior analysts in the other five years. Even if the 
previous year’s classification is superior, the average result is still inferior. Thus the average 
classification will make the regression of the market reaction ignore the previous year’s 
forecasting ability. Instead, using the dynamic way to regress the abnormal return and analysts’ 
classification will make the reaction more accurate to the previous year’s forecasting ability.  
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5: Conclusion 
Analysts conduct their analysis on an individual basis with relevant company-specific 
information and macro economy data. Since most of their analysis are based on proprietary 
models without revealing fundamental logic and extensive details about the forecasting process, 
investors need to identify superior analysts whose forecasts and recommendations are more 
accurate and deserve their trust.  
To gauge this difference, we used article Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior 
investment recommendations as our assumption to measure forecasting ability. According to Loh 
and Mian (2006), “analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more profitable 
stock recommendations”. Moreover, the higher the forecasting ability, the more accurate 
recommendations will be. Our results support the hypothesis that earnings forecasts of superior 
analysts outperform those of inferior analysts. What’s more, there is a persistency in the 
forecasting ability. When we analyze further into the subordinate groups, we find that the 
earnings forecasts of superior analysts are more persistent than inferior analysts’ in terms of 
forecast accuracy. 
With two groups of analysts, we try to find out the market reaction toward superior 
analysts and inferior analysts. Our results show that after the analyst reports come out, the 
abnormal returns fluctuate accordingly, which means the market reacts to the analyst reports. 
However, there is no significant difference in market reaction between superior analysts and 
inferior analysts, which means that the market follows the recommendations blindly, regardless of 
the sources, whether it is from superior analysts or from inferior analysts. 
This paper is among the first to combine the analysis of analyst forecasting abilities with 
the market reaction to the different abilities. However, there are still more works that can be done 
further.  
First of all, the persistency is still not that clear, that is to say, the rank difference between 
groups is not very large. The main reason that causes this result is the way we separate the 
analysts. One possible improvement is to detect what level would be better to divide the analysts. 
Half-half may not be the best way. The ratio can be set to be k%, i.e. the first k% is named as 
“good” while the bottom k% is named as “bad”. Then for different years, we can draw a chart to 
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show the shift from group to group. If there is no persistency, then the probability of an analyst 
shows a (good, good) is k^2/10000, if the statistic data shows a significant difference between 
frequency (good, good) and k^2/10000, then there is persistency of “good” group. The same thing 
can be done for the “bad” group. 
Secondly, if we can test persistency over longer time lags, there may other implications 
about superior analysts’ forecast ability. Over a two-years observation window, we may be able 
to identify a trend in superior analysts’ forecast ability getting better, which means that with a 
longer time period, superior analysts tend to stay superior. If this phenomenon shows in longer 
lags, such as lag 3, lag4 and lag5, we will have better ability to show that even if in the short-term 
superior analysts’ performance may not be very persistent, they will eventually be able to 
differentiate themselves from the inferior analysts in the long run.   
Thirdly, the way we set the group is too simple; it is only based on the firm name and year. 
However, a more reasonable way to do is to add other control variables that have an effect on the 
character of the firm. For example, Fama-French factors, beta and industry would contribute to 
further research. The conclusion would be more in detail. We found out that there is persistency 
but we are not sure whether this persistency is generated from big firms like Yahoo and Apple or 
from small firms like Taseko Mines. If there is a difference between these groups, the result will 
be more interesting. Maybe we can even find out analysts that are extremely good at estimating 
small firms and those who do well in big firms. 
Lastly, we lack the proof of a relationship between the ability of forecasting and making a 
good recommendation. A more direct way to test if an analyst is good or bad from the 
recommendation perspective should be if we create a portfolio and uses different analysts’ 
recommendation from the first few years as a test. See if they have good or bad returns and 
compare these results to the forecasting ability. Only if these two groups show significant 
persistency, we can say that it is acceptable to use the forecasting ability to distinguish “superior” 
from “inferior” analysts. This part of the empirical analysis is missing. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Persistency of analyst forecasting over years.   
The table reports the t-test result for forecasting ability difference between inferior analysts 
and superior analysts in 1993 - 2016. In Panel A, the result shows that the expected difference of 
inferior and superior analysts is significantly different from zero, which means that after one year, 
there is still a difference between the two groups of analysts. The result also shows that the 
expected quality of inferior analysts is different from 0.5 (the result from a random mix of two 
kinds of analysts) at a 95% confidence level, which means that after one year, inferior analysts 
are still inferior in 95% of the time. In Panel B, the result shows that the expected difference of 
inferior and superior analysts is significantly different from zero, which means that after two 
years, there is still a difference between the two groups of analysts. The result shows that the 
expected quality of both inferior and superior analysts is different from 0.5 (the result from a 
random mix of two kinds of analysts) at a 95% confidence level, which means that after two years, 
inferior and superior analysts stay as inferior and superior analysts in 95% of the time. The t-
statistic is provided in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Persistency of analyst forecasting over two consecutive years 
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Panel B: Persistency of analyst forecasting over three consecutive years 
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Table 2: Market reaction to analysts’ recommendations. 
The table reports regression results for the observed firms’ abnormal returns in 1993-2016. 
The dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return of the firm on its announcement day and 
the next trading day. Change in recommendation is the difference between the new 
recommendation and the previous recommendation where the recommendation level is quantified 
from 1 strong buy to 5 sell. If the recommendation changes from strong buy 1 to buy 2, the 
change in recommendation should be 1, vice versa. Analyst quality is an indicator equal to zero 
for inferior analysts and is one for superior analysts. The interaction term of Change in 
recommendation and analyst quality is different analysts’ change in recommendation. Intercept 
stands for the abnormal return when there is no change in recommendation.  
In Panel A (1) regression, the significant negative coefficient of Change in 
recommendation shows that market will react with a negative abnormal return when there is a 
downgrade in the analyst’s recommendation. The close to zero Intercept shows that market does 
not react to the recommendation when there is no change in the recommendation. In Panel A (2) 
regression, the significant negative coefficient of Change in recommendation shows that market 
will react with a negative abnormal return when there is a downgrade in all analysts’ 
recommendations. The insignificant coefficient of Analyst quality shows that the market is smart 
enough to avoid blindly following any recommendations superior analysts announce. In other 
words, the market does not react to the type of the analysts. Therefore, we introduce an 
interaction term of Change in recommendation and analyst quality. The insignificant negative 
coefficient of this term shows that market reacts to different analysts’ recommendation in a 
negative direction. However, the market is not smart enough to follow superior analysts and avoid 
inferior analysts. The close to zero Intercept still shows that market does not react to the 
recommendation when there is no change in the recommendation. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and the t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.  
In Panel B regression, we use the dynamic classification of superior analysts and inferior 
analysts in the following regression. Therefore, we are able to investigate whether an analyst who 
is classified to be superior in year N will trigger a reaction in the market’s abnormal return in year 
N+1 based on his/her recommendation in year N+1. In Panel B (1), the previous market reaction 
result still holds with analysts’ recommendation as a whole. In Panel B (2) regression, the 
significant negative coefficient of Change in recommendation shows that market will react with a 
negative abnormal return when there is a downgrade in all analysts’ recommendations. The 
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insignificant coefficient of Analyst quality shows that the market is smart enough to avoid blindly 
following any recommendations superior analysts announce. In other words, the market does not 
react to the type of the analysts. The 95% confidence level significant negative coefficient of the 
interaction term of Change in recommendation and analyst quality shows that the market is able 
to follow superior analysts and avoid inferior analysts most of the time. The close to zero 
Intercept still shows that market does not react to the recommendation when there is no change in 
the recommendation. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and the t-statistics are provided 
in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Market reaction to static analysts’ groups 
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Panel B: Market reaction to dynamic analysts’ groups 
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